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We examine the diversification patterns of almost all publicly listed non-financial 
companies in China during the 2001 to 2005 period.  More than 70 percent of the firms in 
our sample are diversified.  We document that patterns of diversification strongly depend 
on firms’ political connections.  Former local bureaucrats are more likely than other 
CEOs to enter multiple industries.  This effect is particularly pronounced in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) that operate in weak institutional environments.  These companies are 
particularly prone to entering low-growth, low-profitability, and unrelated industries.   
Consequently, the performance effects of diversification differ sharply across SOEs and 
private firms.  While the latter earn a premium from diversifying their operations, SOEs 
do not.  Our results are consistent with the view that provincial and local governments 
push Chinese SOEs into unattractive sectors of the economy and that politically 
connected CEOs use their relationships to build corporate empires. 
 
JEL Classifications: D23; G32; G38; K42; P26; P31 
Key Words: Corporate Diversification; Institutions; China   2
1. Introduction 
Hunan Jinjian Cereals Industry Co. Ltd (HJCI) was China’s first cereal producer 
to list on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May 1998.  HJCI produces and processes 
grains and oils, a business in which the firm has earned a reputation as the “No.1 brand of 
rice.”  After its initial public offering, the company entered five additional lines of 
business in the next 5 years, including pharmaceutical products, real estate, dairy 
production, electric power generation, and sewage control.  What compelled HJIC to 
transform itself from a focused company to one with such widely diversified operations?  
To what extent does the company’s choice of industries reflect the will of its dominant 
owner, Hunan Province’s Agriculture Bureau?  And does it matter that the company’s 
board members and management team have all been government officials?  These are the 
central questions that we study in this paper. 
Analyzing how government ties influence strategic decision making contributes to 
our understanding of the link between political connections and firm value.  There is now 
a growing literature which documents that politically well-connected firms outperform 
companies without relationships (Dinc, 2005; Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; 
Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Khawaja, and Mian, 2005.)  These 
relationships appear to be particularly valuable in emerging markets such as China.  
Firms can benefit in many ways from their connections: they receive preferential access 
to markets and financing, they sell to government entities at lucrative prices, and they are 
protected from domestic and foreign competition. 
However—as a large number of political scandals indicate—the benefits of being 
politically connected often come at a cost.  In many business environments, connected   3
companies are expected to pay bribes in exchange for favorable treatment.  Direct 
payments to government officials aside, connections can also be costly if firms’ strategic 
options are constrained by political relationships.  For example, connected companies in 
Indonesia tended not to list their shares abroad because they did not wish to be 
scrutinized by foreign regulators and analysts (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).  As a 
result, these firms gave up the capital cost advantages of global financing.   
In this study, we are interested in these strategic costs of connections.  Do the 
strategic decisions of connected firms differ systematically from the decisions of other 
companies?  And if so, what are the performance consequences of such decisions?  While 
there are many papers on the link between connections and firm value, the literature has 
not paid much attention to the mechanisms that underlie the two variables and we know 
very little about the strategic consequences of receiving government support. 
In this study, we use companies’ diversification policies as an example for a 
major strategic decision that might be influenced by political connections.  There is a 
long and distinguished literature on the performance effects of diversification (Lang and 
Stulz, 1994 and many others), which documents that some forms of corporate 
diversification improve financial performance while others waste resources (Stein, 1997; 
Scharfestein, 1998; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2003).  
Diversifying firms are most likely to add value if they capitalize on unique resources that 
cannot be otherwise transferred across firm boundaries through contractual arrangements 
(Coase, 1937; Penrose, 1959; Williamson, 1985; Montgomery, 1994). 
Because successful diversification hinges on scarce resources, it is a priori 
difficult to say if connections improve or worsen the performance consequences of   4
diversification.  On the one hand, firms’ connections represent a valuable resource, 
indicating that connected firms might perform well in industries that are unattractive for 
companies without connections.  For instance, connected companies that receive 
preferential financing might do particularly well in capital-intensive industries.  On the 
other hand, it is also easy to imagine that government connections might be costly.  For 
example, government officials might encourage connected companies to enter labor-
intensive industries that generate a large number of jobs.  If these industries are 
structurally unattractive, being connected might worsen corporate performance. 
To study the performance consequences of firm diversification in China, we 
examine the strategies of almost all publicly traded non-financial firms during 2001 to 
2005.  More than 70 percent of our sample firms are diversified.  Our results indicate that, 
in the Chinese context, politically motivated diversification strategies come at a 
significant cost to their owners.  State-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political 
connections are likely to diversify into low-growth, low-profitability, and unrelated 
industries.  These strategic decisions ultimately result in poor performance.  China’s 
private sector firms diversify as vigorously as SOEs, and private firms also pursue more 
aggressive diversification policies if they are politically connected.  However, unlike 
SOEs, private firms’ diversification patterns lead to superior performance. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  We review the literature and develop our 
hypotheses in section 2.  Section 3 reports the empirical results, and section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Corporate Scope and Political Connections 
2.1. The Literature   5
Why firms diversify is extensively researched by economists and management 
scientists.  It has been argued that firms diversify to capitalize on non-contractible unique 
resources (Penrose, 1959) such as managerial talent (Chandler, 1977; Montgomery, 1994) 
or organizational capability (Matsusaka, 2001), to bypass external markets subject to 
distortion (Williamson, 1985; Stein, 1997), to exercise monopoly power (Hill, 1985; 
Villanonga, 2000), or to reduce risk (Lewellin, 1971; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005).   
Whereas the deployment of scarce resources is expected to improve performance, there 
are many ways in which corporate diversification can misallocate capital (Stulz, 1990; 
Lamont, 1997; Scharfstein, 1998; and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000).  Misguided 
diversification can reflect the misalignment of incentives between top and divisional 
managers (Aron, 1988; and Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994) and an agency problem more 
generally (Jensen, 1986; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). 
Early studies on the performance effects of diversification tended to find that 
diversification was detrimental to firm value (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Comment and Jarrell, 
1995; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Lins and Servaes, 1999; among others).  
However, more recent studies, after controlling for firm and industry heterogeneity, often 
fail to find significant effects (Hyland, 1999; Villalonga, 2000; Maksimovic and Phillips, 
2002; Campa and Kedia, 2002; and Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002). 
There is also a substantial literature on the performance effects of diversification 
in emerging markets (Lins and Servaes, 2002, Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo, 2003; 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2003, 2004; Claessens, Fan, and Lang, 2006). 
Because it is more difficult to write contracts and engage in exchange across corporate 
borders in these business environments, companies with a wider scope might outperform   6
more narrowly focused enterprises (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000; Khanna and Yafeh, 2006). 
Political rent-seeking is another important determinant of the scope of emerging-
market companies (Morck, Yeung, Wolfenzon, 2004).  While there is substantial 
evidence that political connections raise firm value on average (Dinc, 2005; Fisman, 2001; 
Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; 
Khawaja, and Mian, 2005), we are not aware of any other studies that have looked at 
government influence on corporate diversification policies. 
 
2.2.  Political Connections in China 
A key difficulty in documenting the influence of political connections on 
corporate policies is to find a plausible way to measure connectedness.  In this paper, we 
use two such measures.  First, we distinguish between state-owned enterprises and private 
firms.  Private-sector companies play an increasing role in China’s economy, but even 
today, the majority of publicly listed companies are state controlled.  While no firm in 
China operates outside the government’s sphere of influence, we assume the ownership 
difference implies different degrees of government control.  China is well-known for 
having chosen a set of industries in which it plans to play a major role.  For instance, the 
central government has declared car production a “pillar industry.”  To the extent that 
governments encourage existing firms to enter strategically important industries. 
In addition to ownership, we use managers’ political ties as our second measure of 
government influence.  Many companies are led by politically connected CEOs who 
served as bureaucrats in the central or in local governments (Fan, Wong, Zhang, 2007).    7
For both SOEs and private firms, these managers’ ties might indicate that firm policies 
are more influenced by political considerations.  We expect firms with ties to be more 
diversified. 
Whereas political connections are likely to encourage scope extensions, we do not 
have a clear hypothesis about the performance consequences of politically motivated 
diversification policies.  There are some reasons to believe that connections might help 
diversification performance.  Politically connected entrepreneurs might be able to enter 
industries in which their companies will do well.  If they diversify at the government’s 
request, these firms might also benefit from preferential financing and protectionist 
measures.  But there are also reasons to believe that the performance of connected firms 
might suffer because governments push firms into industries for reasons other than their 
profitability.  For example, government officials might expect connected firms to help 
jump start local industries. 
 
2.2.3. Institutional factors 
While government officials might be interested in diversifying their industrial 
base, the cost of diversification varies with firms’ institutional environment.  China’s 
highly decentralized political and economic systems provide large variation in 
institutional environments across its provinces and special districts, while its language, 
culture, and social norm remain unified.  This provides a natural setting to examine how 
institutional constraints affect firm boundaries. 
A first influence is government quality.  It is too optimistic to assume that China’s 
local bureaucrats are all benign and efficient.  We expect poorer-quality governments to   8
be more likely to push firms into diversification projects that these firms may not 
otherwise undertake.  Poorer-quality government may also induce private firms to create 
larger internal markets, so as to mitigate a more difficult business environment. 
A second factor is financial-sector development.  Banks remain the primary 
external source of financing for most firms in China.  China’s banks, all state controlled, 
are known for their soft lending policies that favor SOEs and for their bias against 
providing funds to the private sector.  We expect that firms located in China’s regions of 
poorly developed financial sectors diversify more than firms in more developed financial 
markets.  SOEs diversify because they have access to soft loans. Private firms diversify to 
allocate capital internally, thus bypassing the weak external financial markets. 
 
3.  Sample and Data 
We start with all companies that are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2001 to 2005 period.  The China Securities 
Regulatory Commission requires that publicly traded companies disclose segment 
information for all business segments comprising more than 10% of consolidated sales, 
assets, or profits.  The available information typically includes an industry designation, a 
description of the company’s products and services, as well as segment sales, costs and 
profits.  We manually collect these data from annual reports starting in 2001.  Data for 
prior years are available, but the reporting quality is considered poor. 
From this sample, we exclude companies for which segment and industry 
information is incomplete.  We also omit financial services firms from our study because 
their financial statements are not easily comparable to those of other companies.  With   9
these sample selection criteria, we obtain data for almost 1,300 firms and 5,724 firm-year 
observations. 
We obtain financial data for our sample firms from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) financial statement database. The annual reports of 
Chinese companies contain a brief biographical sketch of the CEO, listing previous 
positions in industry and government (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007).  From these reports, 
we manually collect information on whether a CEO held a position in a central or local 
(provincial) government.  We complement this information with provincial-level 
institutional data that come from various sources, including the China Information Bank 
and the China National Bureau of Statistics. 
 
3.1. Variables 
3.1.1. Diversification patterns 
We measure firm diversification as the number of business segments in which a 
company operates, using 3-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes.  We also 
estimated our models with a 2-digit and 4-digit classification and found qualitatively 
similar results.  As Table 1 documents, 73% of sample firms are diversified.  The median 
company operates in two segments.  Rates of diversification remain stable over time.  We 
come to similar conclusions when we compute a Herfindahl index of firms’ segment 
sales: there is no indication that the concentration of sales evolves over time. 
 
3.1.2. Institutional variables   10
We create two indicators for political connections.  We identify a CEO as 
politically connected at the local level if the executive is or has been a local government 
bureaucrat.  Similarly, we consider a CEO to be politically connected at the central level 
if the executive is holding or held a position as a bureaucrat in the central government. 
To study if the influence of political connections on firm diversification varies 
with a company’s institutional environment, we create two measures: financial market 
development and government quality. 
Financial market development captures the openness of provincial financial 
markets.  We employ a credit ratio to measure such openness, which equals to the credits 
provided to private sector scaled by total credits of financial institutions in a province. 
Our measure of government quality is an index of government size, namely the fraction 
of the population in a province that is not employed in the government bureaucracy. We 
would argue that government size is a reasonable proxy for government quality because 
organizational redundancy and excess employment have been widespread across China’s 
governmental agencies.  The institutional variable, financial market development, is 
transformed using the formula (Vi-Vmin(2001))/(Vmax(2001)-Vmin(2001)))*10, and government 
quality is transformed using the formula: (Vmax(2001)-Vi)/(Vmax(2001)-Vmin(2001)))*10; where 
Vi is the original value, Vmin(2001) is the minimum Vi among all the provinces/special 
districts in 2001, the base year of our investigation period, and Vmax(2001) is the maximum 
Vi among all the provinces/special districts in 2001. Data for the two institutional indices 
are available annually from 2001 to 2005. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the 
variables used in this study. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the variable definitions 
and data sources.   11
 
4. Results 
We start by studying how political connectedness influences firms’ diversification 
decision. We estimate the following model: 
(1)  Diversificationit = α1Connectionit + α2Institutionit + α3Connectionit*Institutionit +  
  α4Sizeit + t + ηi + εit 
In addition to the covariates discussed above, we add to this regression the log of 
firm assets (Size) and a time trend (t), which we implement as year indicators.  All 
specifications in this paper include firm fixed effects, ηi.  As a result, the effect of interest, 
the coefficient a1, is identified from CEO turnover. That is, we are asking whether the 
degree of diversification changes in response to changes in the connectedness of the chief 
executive.  This specification has the advantage that it controls for time-invariant 
unobservables that might influence diversification, for example the firm’s industry and 
the location of the company.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the regression results based on the full sample. As 
expected, larger firms are more diversified. In specification (1), we find that local 
connectedness encourage diversification.  This pattern holds in all the models that we 
estimated. We also investigate the effect of former bureaucrats who served in the central 
government on diversification, but don’t find any significant results.  Consequently, we 
only include the local connections variable in subsequent models. 
The effect of local connections on diversification is positive and highly significant 
throughout the different model specifications in Panel A of Table 3.  Next, we ask 
whether the provincial institutions help determine diversification policies.  Interestingly   12
in column (2) it shows that the more developed is the financial market, the more 
diversified are firms.  It seems that firms are more able to diversify when they have good 
access to credit. This is contrary to the traditional story about financial constraint in firm 
diversification. Furthermore, the interaction results show that good government quality 
reduces the impact of local connections on firm diversification. 
Political connections might have different effects for private and state-owned 
firms.  Panels B and C of Table 3 report estimates for these two subsamples.  The results 
for the state-controlled firms are quite similar to the full-sample results.  Connections also 
lead to more aggressive diversification of private firms, although this effect does not 
seem to depend on the quality of firms’ institutional environment. 
 
4.1.  Performance Effects of Diversification 
Politically connected firms in China, both state-owned and private, diversify more 
aggressively than companies without connections.  For state-owned firms, this effect is 
particularly pronounced in provinces with weak institutions.  In this section, we study the 
performance consequences of diversification.  We begin by taking a look at the industries 
in which diversified firms decide to compete. 
 
4.1.1. Growth 
Firms are likely to perform better if they compete in quickly growing industries.  
Political connections might either help or hurt companies; help if executives can use their 
connections to enter attractive industries, hurt if governments push connected companies   13
into unattractive segments of the economy.  We estimate models that are similar to 
specification (1): 
(2)  Growthit = α1Connectionit + α2Institutionit + α3Connectionit*Institutionit + α4Sizeit  
  + t + ηi + εit 
Growthit is the sales-weighted historical three-year average growth rate of all 
segments in which the firm operates.  Although segment growth rates do not vary by firm, 
Growthit varies within firm over time because companies enter and leave segments.  As a 
result, we can estimate (2) with firm fixed effects ηi.  As in our earlier models, the effect 
of interest α1 is identified from changes in connections over time which reflect CEO 
turnover. 
Table 4 reports the results of these growth regressions. Firms with connections 
operate in slower-growing industries.  As before, we can ask if private and state-owned 
firms behave differently (Panel B).  Surprisingly, we find that connections lower the 
growth of state-owned companies. This is consistent with the predication that 
governments push SOEs into unattractive industries for the reasons other than economic 
factors.  Taking institutions into account, we find that better institutions improve SOEs’ 
growth prospects.  As suggested by the positive interaction terms, in provinces with more 
developed financial markets and fewer bureaucrats, connected CEOs are less prone to 
operate in low-growth segments of the industry.  
The results for private companies are interesting. Connection helps private firms 
enter high-growth industries. Furthermore when government is bureaucratic, connected 
private firms are more likely to seek rents and enter high-growth industries, as suggested 
by the statistically significant interaction term.   14
 
4.1.2. Profitability   
In Table 5, we replace the growth variable with a measure of profitability, a 
similarly constructed segment-sales-weighted industry ROS.  In Panel A, we find hgiher 
government quality leads companies to diversify into higher-profitability industries.   
Panel B reports sub-sample findings. Overall, connection tends to bear no relation to the 
profitability index. As in the earlier panel, there is some evidence that politically 
connected SOEs are more likely than unconnected SOEs to diversify into lower 
profitability industries when financial market are underdeveloped, as suggested by the 
positive coefficients on the interaction term. This is a possible result of ‘soft budget 
constraint’, the problem is exaggerated if firms are politically connected. Conversely, the 
interaction result of sub-sample private firms shows that political ties help them 
overcome the financing difficulties in less developed markets and diversify into 
industries of historical profitability patterns. 
 
4.1.3. Relatedness 
A common finding in the corporate strategy literature is that diversified firms 
perform better if they operate in closely related industries.  We construct a relatedness 
variable of ‘Complementarity’ employing commodity flow information in the national 
economy’s input-output matrix.
1 The procedure involves two steps. First, we compute for 
each of the 124 industries defined in the 1997 Chinese input-output table the percentage 
of its output supplied to each intermediate industry k, denoted as bik.  For each pair of 
                                                 
1 Our approach is a modified version of Fan and Lang (2000).   15
industries i and j, we compute the simple correlation coefficient between bik and bjk across 
all k except for i and j.  A large correlation coefficient in the percentage output flows 
suggests a significant overlap in the markets to which industries i and j sell their products.  
For each pair of industries, we also compute a simple correlation coefficient across 
industry input structures (for all k except i and j) between the input coefficients vki and vkj.  
Here, a large correlation coefficient between two industries suggests a significant overlap 
in inputs. We then define a relatedness coefficient which is simply the maximum of the 
two correlation coefficients. 
In a second step, we construct a firm-level complementarity measure as the sales-
weighted average of the relatedness coefficients of a company’s segments, excluding 










, where wi is the 
sales weight of segment i, and Cij is the relatedness coefficient between segment i and j.
2 
Table 6 reports the regression results for this relatedness variable, 
‘Complementarity’. The negative coefficients of ‘local connection’ mean that political 
connection reduces the relatedness of firms’ industries. In panel A the results show that 
institutional factors have little direct effects on relatedness. However, the interaction 
terms between connection and government quality is positive and significant. This 
evidence is consistent with the view that, in poor institutional regions with low quality 
government, politically connected firms are more likely to diversify into unrelated 
industries than are unconnected firms.  Broken up by state versus private ownership, we 
                                                 
2 The sum of the sales-weighted relatedness coefficients is divided by n - 1 to account for the effect that the 
weighted sum increases with the number of segments.  For example, consider a three-segment firm with 
equal sales weight (1/3).  Assuming the relatedness coefficients for pairs of the segments are all 1. Then the 
weighted sum of the relatedness coefficients is 2.  Dividing the weighted sum by 2 (3-1) will scale back the 
relatedness index to 1. Unadjusted, the sum would rise with the number of segments.   16
find that these interaction effects are primarily attributable to SOEs (Panel B). This result 
further supports our claims that political connection is sometimes costly. Under the 
influence of local governments, SOEs are more likely enter unrelated industries. There is 
little evidence that private firms are similarly subject to these constraints. 
In summary, the results in Tables 4-6 cast some doubt on whether politically 
connected Chinese firms diversify to improve their financial performance.  This is 
particularly true for state-owned companies.  When the CEOs of these enterprises are 
politically connected, they are more likely to diversify into industries with lower growth 
potential and profitability, and into industries that are less related to one another.  These 
patterns are even stronger for state-owned enterprises that are located in provinces with 
lower financial market development and poor government quality. By contrast, the 
diversification patterns of private firms are much less subject to the influences of 
institutional factors. 
 
4.1.5. Diversification  Performance 
While it is interesting to study what types of industries politically connected firms 
enter, the performance consequences of such entry are difficult to predict.  Although our 
data show that state-owned enterprises tend to enter more difficult segments of the 
economy, the political connections of these companies might help them outperform their 
rivals in these slow-growing, less profitable industries. In this section, we analyze the 
performance consequences of diversification more directly by estimating the following 
system of equations: 
(3)  Diversificationit = α1Connectionit + α2Sizeit + t + ηi + ε1it   17
(4)  Performanceit = b1Connectionit + b2Diversificationit + b3Sizeit + t + ηi + ε2it 
Equation (3) is a variant of the models that we estimated in Tables 3-6. These 
results show that connected firms tend to be more highly diversified.  As (4) indicates, 
both connections and the degree of diversification are likely to have an influence on the 
financial performance of companies.  To estimate (4), we assume that cov(ε1it, ε2it)=0.  
This assumption holds as long as performance has no influence on connections or 
diversification.  The former must be true—CEO’s political connections were formed in 
the past and current performance cannot influence the likelihood of having served in a 
local bureaucracy.  Similarly, performance at time t might influence future diversification, 
but it cannot influence the contemporaneous number of segments in which the firm 
operates.  Under these assumptions, (3) and (4) form a recursive system that can be 
estimated using OLS. 
We use three proxies for the performance of our sample firms, ROS, ROA and 
excess value. ROS and ROA equal to net earning divided by total sales and total assets, 
respectively. Similar to the definition in Berger and Ofek (1995), excess value is the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of firm actual value to its imputed value. We calculate a 
firm’s imputed value as the sale-weight sum of the imputed values of its segments, with 
each segment’s imputed value equal to its industry median ratio of firm value to total 
assets. Table 7 reports these results. For private companies, corporate diversification 
improves financial performance and increases market value.  This is not the case for 
state-owned enterprises, for which diversification bears no relation to profitability and 
firm value.  This result may seem surprising in view of our earlier finding that SOEs tend   18
to enter structurally unattractive industries.  One interpretation is that connected CEOs 
both hurt and help their companies.  They hurt performance because they enter more 
difficult segments of the economy, but—conditional on having diversified in this 
particular manner—CEO’s connections might help improve performance by securing 
access to finance and markets. 
As Table 7 documents, political connections also influence firm performance over 
and above their impact on diversification.  CEOs who are former bureaucrats perform 
worse when they run state-owned enterprises (see also Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007), but 
there is no such effect for private companies. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have examined the diversification patterns of publicly listed firms in China, 
finding that the great majority of these firms operate in diversified industries. We also 
document that firms’ diversification levels are closely related to their ownership structure, 
government influence, and institutional strength of their business environment.  
State-controlled firms led by a CEO with local connections tend to diversify more 
aggressively than otherwise unconnected SOEs. In contrast, we find no evidence that 
former central government bureaucrats pursue distinct diversification policies.  The 
locally connected SOEs diversify even more when they confront poorly developed 
financial markets or poor-quality government. SOEs, especially those led by locally 
connected CEOs whose companies are located in weak institutional regions, are prone to   19
diversify into low-growth, low-profitability, and unrelated industries.  Despite these 
challenges, SOEs’ diversification performance is neutral. However, their political 
connections with bureaucrats in general are associated with poor performance outcome. 
China’s listed private firms also diversify more when their CEOs are politically 
connected.  However, their diversification patterns are little influenced by institutional 
factors, and there is no evidence that political connections and institutional factors affect 
the choice of industries into which the private firms diversify. There is also no evidence 
that political connections are detrimental to private firms’ performance. Indeed we find 
that diversification by private firms is on average associated with better accounting 
performance. 
The findings in this paper suggest two causes of firm diversification in the 
Chinese context. First, diversification can be the result of a government push into 
unattractive industries. This idea is consistent with our finding that local but not national 
connections matter for diversification policies.  There is ample anecdotal evidence that 
local and provincial governments strive to be present in particular industries.  For 
example, all but two provinces have entered car assembly, with the result that most plants 
remain subscale and unprofitable.  In contrast to local and provincial governments, 
central government officials might be more agnostic as to the particular location of an 
industry. 
A second possibility is that the patterns of diversification of state-owned 
enterprises reflect empire-building on the part of former bureaucrats.  Because these 
CEOs are likely to face a soft budget constraint—and many of them will be able to count   20
on protectionist policies that shield their firm from competition—they pursue more 
careless diversification policies. As a result, these CEOs forgo the diversification 
premium that we find for private companies.  This idea is consistent with our observation 
that SOEs diversify more aggressively in weak institutional environments. 
In our view, both motivations—government push and managerial empire-
building—are likely to operate simultaneously in the Chinese business environment.  To 
assess the relative importance of these mechanisms is an interesting task for future 
research.  21
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Table1 Summary Statistics 
This table presents the pattern of Chinese firms' diversification. Segment number is the number of a firm's 
business segments sharing different 3-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. Herfindahl index 
is the sum of the squared values of each segment's sale as a fraction of total firm sales in a firm. Multiple 
segments is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has multiple segments. 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max. 
Segment  number        
2001  992  2.6069  2.00   1.5170   1.00   10.00  
2002  1076  2.6310   2.00   1.6048  1.00   12.00  
2003  1144  2.6757  2.00   1.6203  1.00   11.00  
2004  1252  2.6957  2.00   1.6508  1.00   12.00  
2005  1260  2.6921  2.00   1.6541  1.00   13.00  
Total  5724  2.6633  2.00   1.6141  1.00   13.00  
Herfindahl  index        
2001  992  0.7499 0.8121 0.2405 0.2049  1 
2002  1076  0.7467 0.7903 0.2436 0.1756  1 
2003  1144 0.7463 0.802 0.2432  0.1702  1 
2004 1252  0.7466  0.8  0.2421  0.1705  1 
2005  1260  0.7528 0.8165 0.2404 0.1467  1 
Total  5724  0.7485 0.8021 0.2419 0.1467  1 
Multiple  segments        
2001  992  0.7399  1.00   0.4389  0.00   1.00  
2002  1076  0.7230   1.00   0.4477  0.00   1.00  
2003  1144  0.7273  1.00   0.4456  0.00   1.00  
2004  1252  0.7316  1.00   0.4433  0.00   1.00  
2005  1260  0.7286  1.00   0.4449  0.00   1.00  
Total  5724  0.7299  1.00   0.4440   0.00   1.00  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
This table provides the summary statistics of our key variables. 'Segment number' is the number of a firm's 
business segments sharing different 3-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. 'Herfindahl index' 
is the sum of the squared values of each segment's sale as a fraction of total firm sales in a firm. 'Multiple 
segment' is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has multiple segments. 'Local connection' is a dummy 
variable equal to one if a firm's chief executive officer (CEO) is or has been a local government bureaucrat. 
'Financial market development' and 'Government quality' are provincial-level institutional indices as 
defined in Appendix 1. 'Size' is the natural logarithm of firm assets. 'Growth' is the sales-weighted 
historical three-year average growth rate of all segments in which the firm operates. 'Profitability' is the 
sales-weighted historical three-year average ROS of all industry segments in which the firm operates. 
'Complementarity' is a relatedness variable constructed following the method of Land and Fan (2000).'ROS' 
is defined as net earnings divided by total sales. 'ROA' is defined as EBIT divided by total assets. 'Excess 
value' is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of firm actual value to its imputed value. 
Panel A Firm characteristic       
Variable Obs.  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max. 
Segment  number 5724  2.6633 2.0000 1.6141 1.0000  13.0000 
Herfindahl  index 5724  0.7485 0.8021 0.2419 0.1467 1.0000 
Multiple  segment 5724  0.7299 1.0000 0.4440 0.0000 1.0000 
Local  connection 5724  0.1705 0.0000 0.3761 0.0000 1.0000 
Financial market 
development  155  5.7690 5.9900 3.2368 0.0000  12.2200 
Government  quality  155  4.9392 5.6400 3.7655  -11.9400  10.4400 
Size  5724  21.110 21.024 0.9663 16.884 26.978 
 
 
Panel  B  Firm  performance         
Variable Obs.  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max. 
Growth  5719  0.3953 0.2312 0.6839 -0.3159  11.6585 
Profitability  5721  -0.1915 -0.0211 0.7242 -9.4889 5.5664 
Complementarity 5724  0.5136 0.3985 0.3585 -0.0358 1.0000 
ROS  5724  -0.0565 0.0457 0.6258 -4.9186 0.4922 
ROA  5689  0.0323 0.0461 0.0928 -0.4993 0.1951 
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Table 3 Determinants of diversification 
The dependent variable is 'Segment number' measured as the number of a firm's business segments sharing 
different 3-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. 'Local connection' is a dummy variable equal 
to one if a firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) is or has been a local government bureaucrat. 'Financial 
market development' and 'Government quality' are provincial-level institutional indices as defined in 
Appendix 1. 'Size' is the natural logarithm of firm assets. Year dummy variables are included in the 
regressions. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A Full sample 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Local  connection  0.177*** 0.177*** 0.534*** 
  (3.23) (3.23) (3.61) 
Financial market development    0.026**  0.029*** 
   (2.41)  (2.66) 
Government quality    -0.021  -0.015 
   (-0.90)  (-0.65) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     -0.016 
     (-1.49) 
Local connection * 
Government quality     -0.044** 
     (-2.12) 
Size  0.411*** 0.409*** 0.413*** 
  (10.07) (10.01) (10.10) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fix  effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5724  5724  5724 
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Panel B SOEs 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Local connection  0.136**  0.135**  0.638*** 
  (2.06) (2.05) (3.39) 
Financial market development    0.041***  0.044*** 
   (3.26)  (3.43) 
Government quality    -0.020  -0.008 
   (-0.73)  (-0.28) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     -0.018 
     (-1.37) 
Local connection * 
Government quality     -0.067*** 
     (-2.59) 
Size  0.284*** 0.282*** 0.290*** 
  (5.78) (5.74) (5.90) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fix  effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4342 4342 4342 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.87   28
Panel C Private firms 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Local connection  0.301***  0.300***  0.192 
  (2.70) (2.69) (0.75) 
Financial market development    -0.007  -0.009 
   (-0.34)  (-0.39) 
Government quality    -0.018  -0.018 
   (-0.36)  (-0.36) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     0.006 
     (0.27) 
Local connection * 
Government quality     0.012 
     (0.34) 
Size  0.688*** 0.685*** 0.685*** 
  (9.21) (9.12) (9.11) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fix  effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1382 1382 1382 
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 
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Table 4 Industry growth 
The dependent variable is 'Growth' equal to the sales-weighted historical three-year average growth rate of 
all segments in which the firm operates.  'Local connection' is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s 
chief executive officer (CEO) is or has been a local government bureaucrat. 'Financial market development 
' and 'Government quality' are provincial-level institutional indices as defined in Appendix 1 'Size' is the 
natural logarithm of firm assets. Year dummy variables are included in the regressions. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A Full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Local connection  -0.098*  -0.098*  -0.310** 
  (-1.93) (-1.93) (-2.27) 
Financial market development    -0.000  -0.002 
   (-0.00)  (-0.20) 
Government quality    0.014  0.010 
   (0.63)  (0.47) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     0.010 
     (1.00) 
Local connection * 
Government quality     0.026 
     (1.35) 
Size  0.208*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 
  (5.53) (5.56) (5.50) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fix  effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5719  5719  5719 
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Panel B Industry Growth, by type of ownership 
 SOEs  Private  firms 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Local connection  -0.175***  -0.175***  -0.867*** -0.064  -0.063  0.541* 
  (-3.23)  (-3.22) (-5.62) (-0.48)  (-0.47)  (1.76) 
Financial market development    -0.007  -0.010    0.028  0.033 
   (-0.63)  (-1.00)    (1.04)  (1.21) 
Government quality    -0.013 -0.030    0.051  0.051 
   (-0.59)  (-1.33)    (0.85)  (0.85) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     0.024**     -0.019 
     (2.25)     (-0.69) 
Local connection * Government 
quality     0.093***     -0.084** 
     (4.37)     (-1.98) 
Size 0.237***  0.236***  0.225***  0.140  0.150*  0.146 
  (5.88) (5.84)  (5.58)  (1.55) (1.65) (1.61) 
Year Controlled  Controlled  Controlled Controlled  Controlled  Controlled 
Fix  effect  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4337 4337  4337  1382 1382 1382 
R-squared  0.36 0.36  0.36  0.35 0.35 0.36   31
Table 5 Industry profitability  
The dependent variable is 'Profitability' equal to the sales-weighted historical three-year average ROS of all 
industry segments in which the firm operates.  'Local connection' is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) is or has been a local government bureaucrat. 'Financial market 
development' and 'Government quality' are provincial-level institutional indices as defined in Appendix 1. 
'Size' is the natural logarithm of firm assets. Year dummy variables are included. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A Full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Local  connection  0.022 0.022 0.057 
  (0.49) (0.48) (0.56) 
Financial market development    -0.000  -0.003 
   (-0.04)  (-0.27) 
Government quality    0.037**  0.040** 
   (2.16)  (2.28) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     0.012 
     (1.29) 
Local connection * 
Government quality     -0.019 
     (-1.45) 
Size  0.068 0.071 0.071 
  (1.36) (1.47) (1.45) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fix  effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5721 5721 5721 
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Panel B Industry profitability, by type of ownership 
 SOE  Private 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
Local connection  0.017  0.017  -0.036  0.040  0.044  0.298 
 (0.44)  (0.45)  (-0.34)  (0.44)  (0.47)  (1.56) 
Financial market development    -0.008  -0.012    -0.007  -0.001 
   (-0.61)  (-0.97)    (-0.34)  (-0.04) 
Government quality   0.005  0.008    0.120*** 0.123*** 
   (0.22)  (0.38)    (3.13)  (3.16) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     0.021**      -0.034* 
     (2.11)      (-1.88) 
Local connection * Government 
quality     -0.014      -0.008 
     (-1.05)      (-0.28) 
Size 0.028  0.029  0.027  0.160  0.178*  0.180* 
  (0.64)  (0.67) (0.64)  (1.46) (1.68)  (1.73) 
Year Controlled  Controlled  Controlled Controlled  Controlled  Controlled 
Fix  effect  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations  4339  4339 4339  1382 1382  1382 
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Table 6 Fixed-effect regression results of diversified firm segments’ industry relatedness 
The dependent variable is the relatedness variable of ‘Complementarity’, as defined in Appendix 1. 'Local 
connection' is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm's chief executive officer (CEO) is or has been a local 
government bureaucrat. 'Financial market development' and 'Government quality' are provincial-level 
institutional indices as defined in Appendix 1. 'Size' is the natural logarithm of firm assets. Year dummy 
variables are included in the regressions. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A Full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Local connection  -0.036*  -0.036*  -0.118*** 
  (-1.94) (-1.94) (-2.84) 
Financial market development    -0.004  -0.004 
   (-1.25)  (-1.29) 
Government quality    0.005  0.004 
   (0.78)  (0.52) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     0.001 
     (0.41) 
Local connection * 
Government quality     0.013** 
     (2.26) 
Size  -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.072*** 
  (-4.54) (-4.50) (-4.55) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fix  effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  5724 5724 5724 
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 
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Panel B Sub-samples by ownership 
 SOE  Private 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Local connection  -0.040*  -0.040*  -0.132*** -0.019  -0.019  -0.029 
  (-1.80) (-1.79) (-2.58) (-0.51)  (-0.51)  (-0.39) 
Financial market development    -0.006  -0.006    0.001  0.001 
   (-1.50)  (-1.50)    (0.14)  (0.17) 
Government quality    0.007 0.004    0.007 0.007 
   (0.87)  (0.50)   (0.46)  (0.48) 
Local connection * Financial 
market development     0.001     -0.002 
     (0.24)     (-0.32) 
Local connection * Government 
quality     0.015**      0.004 
     (2.06)     (0.52) 
Size  -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.121***  -0.120***  -0.119*** 
  (-2.81) (-2.78) (-2.85) (-3.68)  (-3.60)  (-3.59) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled  Controlled  Controlled 
Fix  effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  4342 4342 4342 1382  1382  1382 
R-squared  0.80 0.80 0.80 0.77  0.77  0.77   35
Table 7 Fixed-effect regression results of diversification performance 
The dependent variable is ROS, ROA and excess value, alternately. 'ROS' is defined as net earnings divided 
by total sales. 'ROA' is defined as EBIT divided by total assets. 'Excess value' is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of firm actual value to its imputed value. 'Segment number' is the number of a firm's business 
segments sharing different 3-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. 'Local connection' is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a firm's chief executive officer (CEO) is or has been a local government 
bureaucrat. 'Size' is the natural logarithm of firm assets. Year dummy variables are included in the 
regressions. Clustered standard errors by province are estimated. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A Financial performance 
 ROS  ROA 
  Full sample  SOEs  Private firms Full sample  SOEs  Private firms
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local connection  -0.071  -0.082  0.045  -0.020***  -0.001***  0.009 
  (-1.20) (-1.09) (0.35) (-2.89) (-2.81) (0.74) 
Segment  number  0.040**  0.016 0.094*** 0.002  0.039  0.108* 
  (2.27) (0.99) (2.76) (0.62) (0.54) (1.74) 
Size  0.406*** 0.233*** 0.730*** 0.063*** -0.022***  -0.009*** 
  (4.29) (3.32) (3.20) (5.17) (-3.85)  (-3.57) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fix effect  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard  error  Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered 
Observations  5724 4342 1382 5689 4315 1374 
R-squared  0.50 0.42 0.59 0.52 0.52 0.57 
 
Panel B Market value 
 All  SOE  Private 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Local connection  0.004  0.030  -0.004 
 (0.10)  (0.79)  (-0.08) 
Segment number  0.023**  0.017  0.037** 
  (2.24) (1.32) (2.06) 
Size  -0.099*** -0.043 -0.223*** 
  (-3.83) (-1.41) (-3.72) 
Year  Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Fix  effect Yes Yes Yes 
Standard  error  Clustered Clustered Clustered 
Observations  5568 4217 1351 
R-squared 0.68 0.67 0.76   36
Appendix 1 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition  Data  source 
Segment number 
The number of a firm’s business segments sharing 
different 3-digit SIC codes. 
Authors’ estimation from 
Annual Reports 
Herfindahl index 
The sum of the squared values of each firm segment’s 
sale as a fraction of total firm sales. 
Authors’ estimation from 
Annual Reports 
Multiple segment 
A dummy variable equal to one if a firm has multiple 
segments, or otherwise zero. 
Authors’ estimation from 
Annual Reports 
Local connection 
A dummy variable equal to one if a firm’s CEO is or has 
been a local government bureaucrat, or otherwise zero. 




A provincial index is based on the ratio of credits
provided to private sector over total credits of financial 
institutions. The variable is transformed using the 
following formula: (Vi-Vmin(2001))/(Vmax(2001)-
Vmin(2001)))*10, where Vi is the original value, Vmin(2001) is 
the minimum Vi among all the provinces/special districts 
in 2001, and Vmax(2002) is the maximum Vi among all the 
provinces/special districts in 2001. 
Fan and Wang (2006) 
Government 
quality 
A provincial index constructed to be inversely related to 
the number of a local government’s bureaucrats and 
staffs divided by regional population. The variable is 
transformed using the following formula: (Vmax(2001)-
Vi)/(Vmax(2001)-Vmin(2001)))*10, where Vi is the original 
value, Vmin(201) is the minimum Vi among all the 
provinces/special districts in 2001, and Vmax(2001) is the 
maximum Vi among all the provinces/special districts in 
2001. 
Fan and Wang (2006) 
Growth 
The sales-weighted sum of a firm’s segments’ industry 
growth estimated by the historical three-year average 
industry sales growth rate. The annual industry sales 
growth is the average sales growth rate of all firms in the 
segment’s 3-digit SIC industry.  
Authors’ calculation from 
Annual Reports 
Profitability 
The sales-weighted sum of a firm’s segments’ industry 
ROS estimated by the historical three-year average 
industry ROS. The annual industry ROS is the average 
ROS of all firms in the segment’s 3-digit SIC industry. 
Authors’ calculation from 
Annual Reports 
Complementarity 
A firm-level index defined as the sales-weighted average 











, where wi is the sales weight of 
segment  i.  Cij is the relatedness coefficient between 
industry i and j, the maximum of the correlation 
coefficient of the two industries’ input and output flows. 
Authors’ calculation from 
Annual Reports and 
China’s 1997 Input-
Output Table 
Size  The natural logarithm of firm assets  CSMAR
a 
ROS 
The return to assets, defined as net earnings divided by 
total sales  CSMAR 
ROA 
The return to sales, defined as net earnings divided by 
total assets  CSMAR   37
Excess value 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of firm actual value to 
its imputed value.  A firm’s imputed value is the sale-
weight sum of each segment’s industry median ratio of 
market value to total assets. The industry median ratio is 
based on the narrowest SIC grouping that includes at 
least three single-segment firms. 
CSMAR 
a CSMAR is China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database, developed by Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University and Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co. Ltd. 
 